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Abstract 
Commercial real estate pricing has its foundations in present value theory although improved 
access to transaction data heightened interest in hedonic pricing models. Heretofore, the commercial 
property versions of these models follow traditions for pricing non-market rent paying durable assets, 
principally residential housing. We present a pricing model that departs from tradition by 
incorporating city-specific net operating incomes and the capitalization rates into the hedonic 
equation. Property attributes and location characteristics serve as proxies for unobservable, asset cash 
flows; city incomes account for local cash flow effects; and the capitalization rate represent local and 
national capital market influences. Modeling commercial real estate in this way allows us to recognize 
the relative contributions of property, local market, and national market determinants. Empirical 
testing relies on a sample of hotel transactions from 2005-2010. The choice of hotels stems from the 
responsiveness of these properties’ cash flows to market changes in the absence of lease friction and 
the homogeneity of the physical assets. Our model explains nearly 80 percent of the variation in hotel 
asset prices. We find that prices are collectively determined by property, city income, and capital 
market characteristics. Models only with property characteristics slightly outperform models with 
present value variables. 
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I. Introduction 
A hedonic pricing model for commercial real estate (CRE) is presented here that 
generates implicit prices from property attributes together with implicit prices of both local 
market net rents and capitalization rates consistent with present value theory. We estimate 
the model parameters without the Rosen (1984) equivalent of an underlying utility theory 
for investment in differentiated CRE attributes. Instead we assume that property attribute 
coefficients represent the marginal utilities received from additional units of these attributes 
offered at unique locations in line with urban economic theory. The implicit prices thus serve 
as proxies for unobserved property net rents. Heretofore, CRE hedonic studies closely 
followed the housing literature by relying on property-specific and transaction-specific 
characteristics for prediction. We diverge from this tradition by recognizing the 
contributions on financial variables that represent local market economics and capital 
market effects.  
 Because our model uses local market net rents and capitalization rates together with 
property attributes, we have the ability to examine the determinants of CRE transaction 
prices across three main effects: (1) net rental for the property (2), net rental for the local 
market (i.e., city), (3) the city and national capital market. This approach allows us to assess 
the relative contributions of systematic (i.e., city and national) and unsystematic (i.e., 
property) value determinants. Our econometric approach addresses endogeneity issues that 
arise as the result of mixing these effects within the same model.  
The various property types that comprise the investible universe of CRE share many 
common features. Each type is subject to the same land rent conditions that determine 
capital and land contributions; CRE is similarly treated in the capital markets (Gyourko, 
2009). Property types also embody idiosyncratic characteristics. These unique features 
originate from endemic physical attributes and institutional arrangements found in 
specialized contracts (i.e., lease provisions) - the effects of which on space market rents, 
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property prices, and securitized asset prices have been subjects for a large number of 
studies.1  
We focus on the hotel property type for estimating our model by utilizing transaction 
information from U.S. hotel markets. Hotels have a highly visible presence in cities despite 
only comprising only about ten percent of the CRE universe (Florence, Miller, Peng, and 
Spivey, 2010 and Prudential, 2009). Among the approximately 130 NAREIT member equity 
REITs, less than 20 own hotel portfolios. These facts may explain why the asset pricing and 
market behaviors of hotels have not been heavily researched. The scarcity of hotel real estate 
data is another barrier. For example, only in recent years has NCREIF maintained a hotel 
index; and even now the number of properties in the index is small relative to other NCREIF 
property-specific indexes.  
Hotel real estate valuation raises some intellectually interesting questions; the answers 
to which have possible implications for the general case of CRE investment analysis and 
valuation. The absence of long-term leases to secure income streams is the most often-cited 
point of differentiation from other CRE. This institutional arrangement provides hotel 
management with the ability to reset many room rates on a daily basis and thus the 
opportunities to grow income in synchronization with upward movements of the market.2 
Also, this process should symmetrically operate in reverse in down markets, albeit not 
necessarily with the same immediacy.3 Short-term rental raises controversial issues about 
cash flow risk (Quan, Li, and Sehgal 2002); franchising effects (O’Neill and Mattila 2010) 
and also management contributions to cash flow generation (Brady and Conlin 2004). Given 
                                                   
1 One topical example is Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley (2010) who find that office buildings with a ‘green 
rating’ sell at a three percent premium relative to identical properties, where ‘identical’ is determined 
from a hedonic specification including multiple controls. 
2 Hotels catering to business travelers may have forward contracts with corporations that establish room 
rate on an annual basis and sometimes for a meaningful number of room nights. Also, many hotels use 
online travel agents to which they pre-sell rooms. Hence the general statement that hotel management 
has the ability mark rents to market is compromised for some hotels. 
3 One of the issues debated in the hotel management literature involves the process of room rate 
‘discounting’ during down markets. See Croes and Semrad (2012) for recent evidence and literature 
review.  
4 | P a g e  
 
the minimal contract friction, hotel markets provide a natural experimental setting for 
examining the sensitivity of fixed-location income streams and asset prices to changes in the 
local and national economic conditions.  
Most importantly, a final point of differentiation comes from the fact that nearly 60 
percent of the over 52,000 U.S. hotels who report their operating performance to data 
aggregator Smith Travel Research (STR), and an even larger share of investment quality 
properties, operate with recognizable brands (Smith Travel Research, 2012). Brand sponsors 
(aka franchisors) impose strict design and construction standards that introduce 
considerable homogeneity within the set of like-branded properties. Sponsors, such as 
Choice, Hilton, Hyatt, Marriott, Intercontinental, Starwood, and Wyndham, require property 
owners to maintain uniform quality standards during franchise contract periods. Failure to 
maintain these standards may result in license termination. Brand standards therefore 
provide ‘built-in’ quality controls across properties of the same brand and same market 
segment that are similar in nature to houses within the same neighborhood, but in contrast 
to other CRE property types. Brands from different sponsors tend to cluster into competitive 
national and local markets which results in similar physical and operational features across 
brands within the same market segment or ‘chain scales’.4 This clustering suggests that 
hotels in the same market segment, although differentiated by brand, serve as close 
substitutes for one another.  
I.1   Rationalization for Our Approach    
Location fixity, durability, and the absence of continuous trading place a greater 
importance on the valuation modeling of real estate relative to traded financial assets and 
commodities. Because so much attention has been directed to real estate valuation model 
development, it is not surprising that different views have emerged over the conceptual and 
                                                   
4 STR defines these market segments into collections of brands know as chain scales. The six chain scales 
are luxury, upper-upscale, upscale, upper-midscale, midscale, and economy.  
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technical matters related to model construction. Importantly, an imaginary line delineates 
the border between relative and absolute modeling approaches for real estate valuation as it 
does in corporate valuation (Damodaran 2002).  
Without the benefit of observable market rents, the pricing of owner-occupied housing 
relies on relative valuations.5 Present value models were almost exclusively used for CRE 
valuation until recent decades when new and improved transaction data bases sparked an 
interest in hedonic and repeat-sale model set ups borrowed from residential property 
valuation. The portability of housing hedonics to CRE is far from direct. Fewer comparable 
transactions typically occur in the CRE markets per period than in housing markets. The 
homogeneity of houses is known to be greater than most types of commercial properties 
hence CRE hedonic valuations require additional controls to conform to the law of one price. 
Importantly, the conceptual foundations of buyer and seller motivations in housing 
compared to CRE hedonic valuations depart in an economically significant way despite 
sharing urban economics principles.  
Hedonic theory enhanced by Rosen (1984) Epple (1987), and Lancaster (1996) from 
early applications by Court (1939) and Griliches (1961, 1971) assumes that the prices of 
differentiated consumer products, including houses, derive from the implicit prices of the 
attribute collections that comprise these products. No transactions occur for these 
attributes (e.g., bedrooms), because they cannot be separated from houses themselves, 
so the prices of the characteristics are never independently observed. Aggregate housing 
demand and supply ultimately determine an attribute’s marginal contribution to the 
prices of the properties. The demand and supply drivers for CRE (e.g., CBD location) 
                                                   
5 Muth (1960) developed a theory of housing demand based on the service flows received by occupants. 
“One unit of housing service is defined as that quantity of service yielded by one unit of housing stock per 
unit of time. The price per unit of housing service, or rent, is the price paid by consumers for the flow of 
services from one standard house peer unit of time (pp. 32-33).” The value of a house then becomes the 
present value of the flow of services net of expenses. Given the difficulty of converting and building pro 
forma of housing service flows in terms of monetary rental flows paid by consuming owner occupants (i.e., 
price time quantity of housing services), valuation models based on financial economics principles never 
emerged. Hedonic models serve to standardize units of housing services.    
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may differ in meaningful ways from the determinants of home prices (e.g., proximity to 
good schools).  
In Rosen’s (1984) two-stage model, consumer demand determinants, such as income, 
are important for estimating implicit prices – consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for 
each attribute. The coefficient estimates from CRE hedonic models might be similarly 
interpreted as the marginal utilities investors receive from additional units of attributes in 
much the same way as housing attribute implicit prices are interpreted by consumers. 
However, an investor utility theory for heterogeneous investment properties and their 
attributes is not well developed. The literature on heterogeneous buyer behavior (Bokhri and 
Geltner 2011), seller behavior (Haurin, Haurin, Nadauld, and Sanders, 2010), and investor 
sentiment (Clayton, Ling, and Naranjo, 2009) is emerging, but nascent at present. Because 
investors achieve wealth maximization objectives by obtaining rights to future net rents, it is 
reasonable to assume that investors achieve these objectives through ownership of CRE 
attributes and thus the aggregation of attribute implicit prices correspond to net rents.   
Our CRE pricing model uniquely incorporates city net rent and capital market pricing 
linked to national net rents together with property attributes that conceptually relate to 
property-specific net rents. Present value and urban economic theories suggest that general 
levels of rents and capitalization rates of cities where properties are located, relative 
properties locations within cities, and the physical characteristics of the property determine 
the asset prices. Endogeneity arises in our hotel property hedonic model as the result of 
introducing city net rents so we estimate model parameters using two-stage least squares in 
which net rent and price are endogenous.  
We find that including only property characteristics in the hedonic model in the 
conventional way leads to slightly better performance than only using present value 
variables. We conclude, however, that hotel asset prices are determined by the combination 
of property, city income, and capital market characteristics selected. This combination 
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explains nearly 80 percent of the variation in hotel asset prices after controlling for 
transaction effects, brand/quality, and time trend.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II contains a review of 
literature – its relevance and findings. In Section III we present a model that sets up the 
empirical research in the paper. Section IV describes the data and explains variable 
construction. The methodology and econometric issues also are discussed in this section.  
Section V presents results from the analysis of hotel transaction data.  Concluding remarks 
appear in the final section.   
II. Related Literature 
Treating CRE as a composite asset class introduces aggregation bias - macro parameters 
deviating from the averages of the component micro parameters (Theil, 1954). Differences in 
risk and return relationships among various property types are demonstrated in 
diversification studies (Fisher and Liang, 2000 and Cheng and Roulac, 2007). Other studies 
show marked differences across property types in the ability of capitalization rates to predict 
future returns (Plazzi, Torous, and Valkanov, 2010), and patterns of construction cycles as 
well as correlations with the business cycle (Wheaton, 1999). Taken together the evidence 
suggests that different economic determinants of prices and returns associated with 
different CRE property types suggest that customized valuation model development for 
major property types has considerable merit. The unique characteristics of hotels noted 
above suggest that existing models used to price CRE do not exactly fit for hotel valuation. 
Our interests in this literature review lie first with the hedonic modeling approaches 
followed in housing and CRE studies; and secondarily with advancements in explaining 
variation in hotel property prices. 
By comparison, the volume of hedonic pricing research in 1-4 family housing far exceeds 
the number of hedonic studies for CRE property types. Given the absence of both observable 
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market rents and a wealth maximizing investment perspective, housing models usually do 
not blend present value and urban economic theory as we do in this study. Of the housing 
studies that rely on present value concepts, Meese and Wallace (1994) find that modeled 
values can substantially deviate from observed house prices in the short run. 
Hoag (1980), in one of earliest published CRE hedonic studies, recognizes that the 
determinants of CRE prices come from macroeconomic and regional economic influences in 
addition to and independent of property fundamentals and location. Since the early 1980s, 
advancements occurred in hedonic pricing to the extent that models began being applied to 
examine a wide variety of practical issues including apartment age restrictions (Guntermann 
and Moon, 2002), rent concessions (Sirmans, Sirmans, and Benjamin, 1990), and 
technological change (Colwell and Ramsland, 2003) to cite a few. Dermisi and McDonald 
(2010) and Wiley and Wyman (2012) provide updated detailed reviews of this literature.  
Some CRE hedonic studies incorporate economic measures, such as national 
employment and GDP, to control for differences in macroeconomic conditions at the times 
of sales. These variables enter hedonic equations without a direct link to asset pricing theory 
and, except for Lockwood and Rutherford (1996) who use LISREL to correct for econometric 
problems; they also introduce multi-colinearity brought on by mixing national and local 
economic determinants within the same model.  We adopt a different approach by relying on 
the city capitalization rate. National capitalization rates embody important macroeconomic 
conditions through the real interest rate and inflationary expectations components. City-
specific capitalization rates carry both national and city systematic risk premiums. 
Importantly, capitalization rates in the same model with NOIs complete the present value 
equation. 
For hotel properties, Corgel (1997, 2007) reports hedonic results with disaggregate 
transaction data using similar sets of property and location characteristics and measures of 
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local market economic strength, such as ZIP or county employment and income.6 The semi-
log regressions explain large percentages of variation in sale price. Most property and all 
local market economic variables are correctly signed and statistically significant. None of 
these equations include either city NOI or capital market effects, although local economic 
variables proxy with error for local area NOI. 
An alternative path to understanding CRE asset market pricing is to explain variation in 
property capitalization rates instead of property transaction prices. Nearly all of these 
studies use aggregate, appraisal-based capitalization rate data. Sivitanidou and Sivitanides 
(1999) and Jud and Winkler (1995), for example, estimate equations with transaction-
generated capitalization rates, but use periodic averages that do not allow for property-level 
quality controls. Only McDonald and Dermisi (2008, 2009) build a capitalization rate model 
with disaggregated transaction data so that local economic, national economic, and property 
characteristics can appear in the same model. A review in Chaney and Hoesli (2012) traces 
this literature from the late 1980s to present and discusses its shortcomings.  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to propose a hedonic model for CRE 
for explaining variation in asset prices based on both urban economic and present value 
theories while recognizing the econometric problems of estimating parameters of such a 
model. This approach allows us to separate the effects of property fundamentals, local 
markets and the macro-level capital market. In contrast to the approach we propose, 
Ghysels, Plazzi, and Valkanov (2007) conclude that … “commercial real estate prices are 
better modeled as financial assets and that the discounted rent model might be more 
suitable than traditional hedonic models, at least at the aggregate level (p. 472-3),” given 
their finding that less than one-third of the variation in capitalization rates is explained by 
property and local economic variables. 
                                                   
6 O’Neill (2004) estimates a hedonic price equation for hotels that includes both hotel financial 
performance variables and local market controls, but he only reports results for financial performance 
variables.   
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III. Model 
Discounting future net rents to generate current present values is deeply rooted in 
financial economic theory as adapted for CRE valuation. The basic form of the model is  
  V0 ∑      
    
(   ) 
                                                                                                                   (1) 
            
where NOIt is the net operating income at the end of period t and r is the risk-adjusted 
discount rate. Following McDonald (2005) and multiplying by (1+r), gives  
V0 (1+r) = NOI1 + V1.                                                                                                           (2) 
 
Rewriting this equation gives,              
             
V0 = (NOI1 + ∆V) / r,                                                                                                                             (3) 
where ∆V = V1 - V0 
The period-zero capitalization rate, C0, comes from solving Equation (3), as follows 
C0 = NOI1 / V0 = r – (∆V/ V0).                                                                                                (4) 
The expression for V0 can be written in the form below assuming the terminal capitalization 
rate equals the initial capitalization rate and the Gordon Growth model takes a general form 
with percent change in value as follows 
V0 = (NOI1 + ∆V) / [C0 + (∆V/ V0)].                                                                                       (5) 
 We present NOI1 as the composite of systematic effects from the local market and 
idiosyncratic property-specific effects. Thus,  
NOI1 = NOIm1 + NOIi1 = (Rm1 - Em1) + (Ri1 - Ei1)                                                                     (6) 
where NOIm1 and NOIi1 represent the NOIs of the local market and individual property, 
respectively. Each NOI has endemic rent (i.e., Rm and Ri) and expense (i.e., Em and Ei) 
components.  
Unobservable property NOI*i1 is estimated from location and physical property 
attributes, Zi, as  
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NOI*i1 = f (Zi,).                                                                                                                            (7) 
The final expression for V0 becomes 
V0 = [NOIm1 + NOI*i1 + ∆V] / (C0 + (∆V/ V0))                                                                       (8) 
All of the parameters in Equation (8) are estimated using a hedonic specification in which the 
local market NOI effect is represented, the city capitalization rate captures both national 
capital market influences and local risk premiums, property NOI effect is included, and trend 
and transaction specific characteristics are controlled for through the time-series and other 
dummy variables, Dt, Dk. 
ln(Pi)= α + β*1ln(NOIm1) – β*2ln(C0 ) +  β3Zi + f (Dt … Dn, Dk ) + ei                                               (9)                                        
Because the present value model embedded in Equation (9) to account for non-property 
related price determinants is non-linear we take the natural logs of both NOIm1 and C0. That 
is,  
ln (β1NOIm1/ β2C0) =  β*1ln(NOIm1) – β*2ln(C0)                                                                             (10) 
 Econometric issues encountered when estimating Equation (8) arise from the possibility that 
NOIm1 is correlated with ei. We discuss this endogeneity problem in a subsequent section.  
IV. Research Design and Method 
Data 
The hotel data for our research primarily come from Real Capital Analytics (RCA). This 
firm collects transaction prices and associated property characteristics for U.S. commercial 
property sales that are greater than $2.5 million. The sample period begins in January 2005 
and ends in December 2010.  Data from CoStar, PKF Hospitality Research, and STR 
augment the RCA data. The subsequent section on variable construction discusses the 
various uses of these supplemental databases.  
Variable Construction 
Hotel property characteristics appear on the right side of our hedonic equations to 
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account for the variation in selling price. We include the effective age (EA) - calculated as the 
year of sale subtracted from the year of renovation, the number of rooms (RM), a landmark 
property dummy (DLAND) which equals one if the hotel is designated as a historical 
landmark and is zero otherwise. Two location dummies also enter these equations. The first 
of these variables captures whether the hotel is located next to water (DH2O) such as 
beachfront property while the second one denotes a CBD hotel location (DCBD). We also 
include a dummy to indicate an expected and important property renovations associated 
with the sale event (DRENO).  
Transaction-specific effects may influence hotel sale prices so controls appear in our 
equations for REIT hotel buyers (DREIT), an effect suggested as meaningful in financial 
press reports, and if individual hotels changed ownership as part of portfolio transactions 
(DPORT).7 The sign on the DPORT coefficient is ambiguous because the composition of the 
portfolio may result in a single property’s price being greater than or less than the price if the 
hotel was sold independent of other assets. 
Based on previous findings in the real estate asset pricing literature, we expect an inverse 
relationship between effective age and the transaction price of hotels. Positive relationships 
are presumed between selling prices and the number of rooms, landmark designation, 
locations near water and in the CBDs, planned hotel renovations, and REIT buyers.  
To measure difficult to observe hotel attributes, a market segment dummy variable series 
is used for differentiation of lower from higher quality hotel features and service levels. 
These are: luxury LUX), upper upscale hotels (UUPS), upscale hotels (UPS), upper midscale 
hotels (UMID), midscale hotels (MID), and economy (ECO) hotel market segments (i.e., 
chain scales).8  Ex-ante, we expect the sold price to increase with hotel quality. As mentioned 
in the introduction of this paper, brand standards result in property homogeneity and 
                                                   
7 The recorded price for a property sold as part of a portfolio is the price reported to RCA. Sometimes RCA 
make an allocation of the portfolio price to each property. 
8 Market segments are defined using STR classification chain scale system. This system is detailed in a 
subsequent section. The luxury hotel dummy is the omitted variable.  
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brands clustered within the chain scales also are of similar quality.  
The extent of economic activity in the immediate surrounding area of the sold hotels may 
not be adequately controlled for by the dummies discussed above hence the daytime 
employment base (i.e., number of employees) within a three mile radius of the hotel location 
was collect the from CoStar and introduced into the hedonic equation (NEMP). The higher 
the daytime employment base, the greater the potential demand for hotel rooms and 
logically a higher selling price. Also, to account for possible differences in hotel demand mix 
(i.e., business group, and transient), we include a dummy variable (DGATE) to reflect 
whether the sold hotel is located in a gateway city. Cities that we define as gateway cities 
include Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, Miami, San Francisco, and 
Washington DC. A dummy variables series starting in 2006 (T06) and ending in 2010 (T10) 
accounts for time trend.9 
City capitalization rates come from RCA and are scaled by number of rooms in each hotel 
to adjust for size effects. This association serves to link the city capitalization rate to the 
property. A city NOI variable is constructed using PKF and STR total revenue and expense 
ratio data during each year. We adjust revenue by one minus the expense ratio of the 
property’s market segment to link the city NOI to each property. The variable construction 
equation is as follows, 
NOIit = RevCity,t * (1- ORMarket Segment i, t).                                                                                             (11) 
 
where NOIit is the city NOI assigned to property i in period t, RevCity,t is the city total revenue 
in period t, and OR is the operating ratio for the applicable chain scale for property i in 
period t. 
V. Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for a sample of 623 hotel real estate sales that 
transacted in the U.S. from 2005 through 2010. As shown in Panel A, the sample includes both 
                                                   
9 The 2005 dummy is the omitted variable. 
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large (i.e., RMmax = 1348) and small hotels (i.e., RMmin = 21). The capitalization rates and NOIs 
are for the city in which the transaction was completed. Statistics for property characteristics 
and transaction-specific variables appear in Panel B. Note that the transactions are spread 
across the six STR chain scales, all dummy variables are well distributed, and 2008-2009 
financial crisis and recession lowered transaction volume.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Hedonic Estimates 
 Our first set of implicit price estimates comes from running the data through the 
standard hedonic model with property attributes, transaction characteristics, and different 
treatments for NOIs and capitalization rates. Table 2 presents the results from estimating four 
alternative models. Models I and II include property and transaction characteristics in levels 
and semi-log functional form. While Model I performs well with most coefficients having the 
correct ex-ante sign and many significant, the semi-log form, as in most real estate hedonic 
studies, statistically dominates. This regression accounts for over 77 percent of the variation in 
hotel transaction prices. All variables have the expected signs and only effective age squared and 
two of the time dummies have coefficients that are not significant at the .10 level or better. 
Model III shows results from a semi-log regression of city NOIs and capitalization rates on hotel 
asset prices while controlling for transaction-specific effects and trend. Both variables have 
highly significant coefficients with expected signs. This simple present value specification 
explains 65 percent of the variation in hotel property prices. In Model IV, we mix the traditional 
hedonic variables with the financial variables. Interestingly, the coefficient vector of the 
traditional hedonic variables differs only slightly from Model II. The sizes and t-statistics of city 
NOI and capitalization rate, however, are markedly different in this specification relative to 
Model III. The coefficients on these variables, while remaining correctly signed, decline in size 
and the t-statistics are smaller. We interpret the results from estimating Model IV as 
confirmation of (1) our priors that hotel prices are determined by separate property-specific and 
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market effects; and (2) potential econometric issues from mixing these variables within the 
same model. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
We have questions about correlations among regressors in these models, especially in 
Model IV. First-order correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors appear in Table 3. 
Multicollinearity detection and testing remain controversial. The correlations between NOI and 
both DGATE and NEMP appear high, yet not alarmingly so, and the variance inflation factors 
for EA and EA2 approach the rule-of-thumb critical level of 10.0 (Kennedy, 2003, p.213). As a 
test, we remove EA and EA2 from Model IV; this results in only very minor changes.  These 
statistics do not raise meaningful concerns regarding the independence among the regressors, 
hence we conclude that our models do not violate the linear independence assumption.  
Not surprisingly, the elasticity estimates presented in Panel C of Table 3 show that hotel 
property prices are fairly elastic with respect to the number of rooms and the capitalization rate, 
but inelastic with respect to city NOI and other continuous explanatory variables. 
 [Insert Table 3 Here] 
Endogeneity Bias and 2-Stage LS Estimation 
 In Equation (9) restated below, hotel prices are modeled as a function of city market NOI 
(NOIm1), property specific characteristics (Zi), city market capitalization rate (C0), time trend of 
price changes (Dt), and transaction-specific price determinants, Dk.  
     ln(Pi)= α + β*1ln(NOIm1) – β*2ln(C0 ) +  β3Zi + f (Dt … Dn, Dk ) + ei                                                       
While we show that the variables representing these determinants are not highly correlated and 
OLS generates reasonable parameter estimates and high although not extreme R-squared, the 
aggregated city NOI likely will not capture all the effects of local market influences on hotel 
property prices. Thus, omitted regressors may be correlated with included regressors and with 
the error term, ei. This observation suggests that NOIm1 is endogenous and its coefficient, β1, is 
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inconsistent. We address this potential endogeniety problem by re-estimating Equation (9) 
using the control-function approach which involves introducing instruments in a first-stage NOI 
regression. The changes in the selected instrumental variable(s) must be associated with 
changes in NOI but not associated with changes in regressors and Pi, except through NOI.   
Three instrumental variables enter the first-stage regression after we extract the gateway city 
dummy, DGATE, from the hedonic model. Table 3 shows the first-order correlation coefficient 
between DGATE and NOI equals .45. This result is not surprising since both DGATE and NOI 
represent citywide effects. Given that DGATE represents a city effect, its use as an instrument in 
the first-stage regression conceptually makes more sense than in the second stage with an 
instrumented NOI.  
The other two instruments are city travel spending, TSPEND, and the number of hotels, 
NHOTEL. Neither of these variables would logically enter a hotel asset pricing equation, but 
TSPEND on the demand side and NHOTEL on the supply side should explain variation in the 
NOI. Equation (11) presents the first-stage estimating equation.         
     NOIm1 = λ + γ1 DGATEi + γ2 TSPENDi + γ3 NHOTEL i + f (Dt … Dn) + ui                                   (12) 
Table 4 presents the second stage results from data for the sample of 623 U.S. hotel sales. 
Comparing these results to those reported in Table 2 for Model IV, most coefficients are of 
nearly the same magnitude and significance levels. The estimated NOI coefficient of .2239 is 
larger from this analysis versus .1358 from OLS which is consistent with our presumption of 
endogeniety bias. The coefficient of NEMP becomes smaller and insignificant with the more 
consistent estimation of NOI. As shown in Table 3, these measures have a correlation coefficient 
of .46. Each of the time dummies becomes insignificant while the coefficient on EA2 is 
significant in this regression. Finally, the R-squared (i.e., .7975 and .7991) and root mean square 
error (i.e., .5136 and .5132) remain virtually the same in the 2SLS run relative to OLS.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
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Robustness Check - Results by Chain Scale  
The universe of approximately 52,000 hotels and nearly 5,000,000 rooms assembled by 
data aggregator STR is widely viewed as ‘the U.S. hotel industry’. This assemblage excludes 
properties with fewer than 20 rooms and includes most hotels with brand affiliations and many 
independent hotels inside the U.S. boundaries. The STR universe is organized into six chain 
scale divisions each consisting of branded hotels of similar quality and ADR plus a large 
independent hotel category. The number (percent) of hotels in each chain scale is as follows 
(Smith Travel Research, 2012):  
Luxury – 307 (.6%), examples include Ritz-Carlton and Four Seasons. 
Upper Upscale – 1,513 (2.9%), examples include Hyatt and Westin. 
Upscale - 3,760 (7.2%), examples include Hilton Garden Inn and Hotel Indigo. 
Upper Midscale – 8,776 (16.8%), examples include Hampton Inn and Fairfield Inn. 
Midscale – 5,336 (10.2%), examples include Quality Inn and Red Lion. 
Economy – 10,363 (19.9%), examples include Motel 6 and Microtel Inn. 
Independent – 22,098 (42.4%). 
 
These data reveal that the hotel industry is not an evenly distributed collection of 
operating businesses. Many more U.S. hotels operate in the economy segment than other chain 
scales. Also, a large number of independent hotels would logically fall into the economy segment 
if classified according to chain scales along price and quality lines. To conduct robustness checks 
on our results from analyzing aggregate data we disaggregate the hotels in our sample into chain 
scales and re-estimate the pricing equations. Because of sample size limitations we combine the 
six chain scales into three classifications – luxury and upper upscale (N=140), upscale and 
upper midscale (N=254), and midscale and economy (N=229). Independent hotels in the 
sample are assigned to a chain scale by examining their room size and amenities.  
Results from re-estimating the hedonic pricing models (i.e., single and two stages) for 
the three hotel market segment classifications appear in Table 5 through Table 7. Focusing on 
the two-stage estimates, the coefficient sizes and statistical significance appear quite similar 
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across the four sets of equations – full sample (Table 4), luxury/upper upscale (Table 5), 
upscale/upper midscale (Table 6), and midscale/economy (Table 7). A bulleted summary of the 
differences is as follows: 
Full Sample and Luxury/Upper Upscale 
 The R-squared is somewhat lower for this sub-sample (i.e., .6479 vs. .7991). 
 Surprisingly, the number of rooms and both age variable coefficients are insignificant. 
 The landmark and recently renovated variable coefficients are not significant in the sub-
sample regression although the landmark coefficient is nearly identical in size. 
 Not surprisingly, the portfolio variable coefficient is not significant in the sub-sample 
regression – higher-end hotels generally sell in one-off transactions. 
 Given the relatively large coefficients on NOI and C, these higher-end hotels seem to be 
priced more on the basis of MSA and capital market strength than other types of hotels. 
 
Full Sample and Upscale/Upper Midscale 
 The R-squared is somewhat lower for this sub-sample (i.e., .6094 vs. .7991). 
 The coefficient vector in the sub-sample closely aligns with the full sample except for the 
number of rooms which is insignificant. 
 
 Full Sample and Midscale/Economy 
 The R-squared is noticeably lower for this sub-sample (i.e., .5824 vs. .7991). 
 As in the other sub-sample regressions, the number of rooms is insignificant.  
 Not surprisingly, variable coefficients that relate more to higher-price hotels are not 
significant in this regression involving lower-price hotel transaction information. These 
are, CBD location, landmark, and water proximity. Yet, REIT buyer is significant.  
 
Taken together, the consistency of coefficient estimates for non-property variables – NOI 
and C - across chain scale regressions outweigh differences among the property variables, many 
of which are explained by intuition. The robustness check generally validates our model 
construction, and adds insights. Notably, City NOI has a larger influence on hotel pricing among 
the higher quality chain scales. The effect of size, albeit small in the regression with aggregate 
data, disappears in the chain scale regressions. 
[Insert Table 5, 6, and 7 Here] 
VI. Conclusion: Property, City, and National Market Pricing Effects 
Hedonic studies of commercial real estate pricing that report the relative importance of 
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property characteristics (i.e., physical and location), local market economics, and national 
financial conditions have focused on accounting for variations in the capitalization rate rather 
than in transaction prices. These studies offer conflicting conclusions. Sivitanidou and 
Sivtanides (1999) and McDonald and Dermisi (2008), for example, find that property attributes 
and local economics are the most important drivers of capitalization rate variation. In contrast, 
Ghysels Plazzi, and Valkanov (2007) and Chervachidze and Wheaton (2013) place the majority 
of weight on macroeconomic conditions. The hotel transaction price data we analyze are suited 
for answering the question because of the absence of lease frictions that would impede the 
incorporation of local and national economic effects into prices. 
  Our model uses local market net rents and capitalization rates together with property 
attributes. This construction gives us the ability to estimate and differentiate among a diverse 
set of CRE transaction price determinants. Stated differently, organizing potential determinants 
of CRE prices along the lines of three main effects: (1) property net rental (i.e., property 
characteristic proxies) (2), city market net rental, (3) the city and national capital market allows 
us to access the relative contributions of systematic (i.e., city and national) and unsystematic 
(i.e., property) value determinants. Given that the variables in our model collectively account for 
both numerator and denominator effects of the present value model, all of the variables are 
economically; and statistically important. Variation in CRE prices should be explained by 
systematic economic factors in the city and nation as well as property specific attributes that 
fundamentally relate to cash flow generation. This is analogous to modeling stock returns of a 
particular company as a function of an overall market effect, an industry effect, and an 
idiosyncratic factor associated with the firm. In this context, academic debates regarding the 
relative importance of property and macroeconomic forces on property values seem less 
meaningful.   
Because we use transaction information along with incomes and interest rates in our model, 
this manifestation of the hedonic model reflects both comparable sales and income 
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capitalization perspectives on property pricing in line with modern appraisal practice and ideas 
about price and value relationships in equilibrium dating back to Alfred Marshall in the mid 
1800s.  
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Panel A - Statistics for Selected Continuous Variables
Variable Symbol N Mean s Minimum Maximum
Sale Price P 623 $31.3 M $55.1M $1.6M $575.0M
Number of Rooms RM 623 184 158 21 1348
3M Number of Employees NEMP 623 6013 12518 17 54402
Effective Age EA 623 15 20 1 113
City NOI NOIC 623 $574,535 $708,127 $30,167 $5,251,023
Capitalization Rate C 623 8.47% 0.06% 5.60% 9.70%
       Sale Price
Category Symbol N Mean s Minimum Maximum
Market Segment
Luxury LUX 28 $105M $111.1M $8M $575M
Upper Upscale UUPS 112 $79.9M $88.3M $5.1M $440M
Upscale UPS 175 $25.4M $21.7M $2.9M $123M
Upper Midscale UMID 79 $14.8M $19.5M $2.8M $130M
Midscale MID 134 $11.1M $11.8M $2.5M $73M
Economy ECO 95 $5.5M $4.4M $1.6M $34M
CBD Location= 1 DCBD 153 $70.3M $81.7M $2M $440M
CBD Location = 0 470 $18.6M $34.8M $1.6M $575M
REIT Buyer = 1 DREIT 156 $37.7M $46.3M $1.7M $440M
REIT Buyer = 0 467 $29.2M $57.6M $1.6M $575M
Landmark = 1 DLAND 27 $90.8M $115M $6.75M $440M
Landmark = 0 596 $28.6M $49.3M $1.6M $575M
Water Access = 1 DH2O 80 $59.3M $91.2M $2.5M $575M
Water Access = 0 543 $27.2M $46.2M $1.6M $440M
Gateway City = 1 DGATE 195 $44.6M $70.9M $2M $440M
Gateway City = 0 428 $25.3M $45M $1.6M $575M
Renovated = 1 DRENO 81 $52.6M $57.4M $1.6M $300M
Renovated = 0 542 $28.1M $54.1M $1.7M $575M
Portfolio Sale = 1 DPORT 146 $23M $22.3M $1.7M $145M
Portfolio Sale = 0 477 $33.9M $61.6M $1.6M $575M
Year of Sale
2005 T05 115 $30.1M $63.9M $2.8M $424M
2006 T06 100 $42.7M $69.1M $2.5M $440M
2007 T07 179 $27.3M $56.3M $1.6M $575M
2008 T08 108 $25.4M $43.2M $2.5M $367M
2009 T09 37 $21.8M $29M $1.6M $123M
2010 T10 84 $39.6M $39.1M $2M $166M
Note:  This table presents the descriptive statistics for a sample of 623 hotel real estate sales in the U.S. that occurred from 
2005 through 2010.                                                                                                                                                                
Sources:  Costar, Moody's Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real capital Analytics, and Smith Travel Research. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Hotel Property Transaction Sample.
Panel B - Statistics by Categorical Variables
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Model
Right-Side 
Variable Label Name Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
ln(NOIC) City NOI .4653* 15.51 .1358* 4.10
ln(C) Capitalization Rate -.9430* -21.33 -.5269* -7.70
RM Number of Rooms 186689* 16.12 .0024* 13.81 .0007* 2.43
EA Effective Age at Date of Sale 17068 0.08 -.0084* -2.46 -.0087* -2.67
EA2 Effective Age Squared -2563 -1.02 .0001 1.19 .0001 1.56
NEMP 3M Number of Employees 34072* 7.78 .0006* 8.43 .0004* 6.47
DCBD CBD Location -3466718 -0.75 .2068* 2.91 .2978* 4.33
DGATE Gateway City 8297052* 2.62 .2970* 6.10 .2149* 4.10
DLAND Landmark Hotel 2.53e+07* 3.38 .2546* 2.20 .3278* 2.99
DH2O Water Location 1.73e+07* 3.9 .3837* 5.62 .4088* 6.33
DRENO Recently Renovated -1.09e+07* -2.36 .1198* 1.68 .0882 1.631
UUPS Upper Upscale Chain Scale -3.70e+07* -4.77 -.4398* -3.69 -.3714* -3.24
UPS Upscale Chain Scale -5.30e+07* -6.81 -.8254* -6.89 -.6617* -5.68
UMID Upper Midscale Chain Scale -6.05e+07* -7.32 -1.2208* -9.59 -.9675* -7.42
MID Midscale Chain Scale -5.35e+07* -6.63 -1.3579* -10.93 -1.0042* -7.75
ECO Economy Chain Scale -5.69e+07* -6.89 -1.7908* -14.09 -1.3911* -10.51
DREIT REIT Buyer 8681458* 2.20 .3847* 6.34 .4124* 5.84 .3489* 6.07
DPORT Portfolio Sale -1052124 -0.29 .1389* 2.46 .0769 1.15 .1268* 2.37
T06 1 = Sold in 2006 7043087 1.43 .2565* 3.37 -.0046 -.05 .1459* 1.99
T07 1 = Sold in 2007 7096943 1.62 .2600* 3.86 -.1960* -2.40 .1335* 2.04
T08 1 = Sold in 2008 2641751 0.54 .2024* 2.71 -1398 -1.53 .1299* 1.81
T09 1 = Sold in 2009 -6480796 -0.96 .0079* 0.08 .3270* -2.56 -.0739 -0.75
T10 1 = Sold in 2010 -5237125 -0.96 .0835 1.00 -2854 -2.75 -.1393* -1.67
α Constant 3.15e+07* 3.44 16.53* 117.22 15.44* 220.17 16.32* 114.42
N = 623
R2 Adj. .5898 .7731 .6508 .7975
RMSE 3.5e+07 .5437 .6746 .5136
Notes: This table presents the results from regressing property characteristics, date-of-sale, and present value variables on 
hotel transaction prices with alternative functional forms. * Significant at .10 or better.                                                                                  
Sources: CoStar, Moody's Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital Analytics, and Smith Travel Research.
ln(P)
I II III IV
Table 2: One-Stage OLS Results, All Hotels 
P ln(P)Dependent Variable ln(P)
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Variable P NOI C RM EA NEMP DCBD DGATE DREIT DLAND DH20 DRENO DPORT UUPS UPS UMID MID ECO
P 1
NOIC .45 1
C -.35 .20 1
RM .66 .26 -.57 1
EA -.02 .07 .17 -.06 1
NEMP .35 .46 -.03 .09 .09 1
DCBD .40 .28 -.14 .32 .32 .6 1
DGATE .21 .45 .01 .04 .04 .37 .25 1
DREIT .07 .08 -.15 -.07 -.01 .03 .07 -.01 1
DLAND .23 .09 -.05 .13 .13 .15 .27 .14 .01 1
DH20 .20 .06 -.03 .18 .18 -.03 .03 -.04 -.07 -.01 1
DRENO .14 .09 -.18 .26 .26 .01 .12 .01 -.05 .03 .12 1
DPORT -.08 .01 -.04 -.12 -.12 -.05 -.10 -.02 .28 -.06 -.08 -.11 1
UUPS .41 .27 -.36 .53 -.04 .07 .22 .09 .02 .13 .13 .34 -.05 1
UPS -.06 .13 -.08 -.09 -.16 -.04 -.04 -.01 .30 -.02 .06 -.10 .24 -.29 1
UMID -.11 -.16 -.01 -.05 .06 .02 -.07 -.04 -.19 -.01 -.04 -.05 -.18 -.18 -.23 1
MID -.19 -.25 .17 -.02 -.13 -.05 -.17 -.09 .02 -.11 -.12 -.17 .06 -.25 -.32 -.20 1
ECO -.20 -.18 .34 -.19 .19 -.05 -.05 .01 -.22 -.04 -.06 -.07 -.10 -.19 -.27 -.16 -.22 1
Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable ηP
EA 9.52 DCBD 2.05 NOIC .0045
EA2 9.28 T10 1.91 C -.0136
DMID 6.57 lnC 1.90 RM .0209
UPS 6.43 T08 1.74 EA -.0087
ECO 5.25 T06 1.70 NEMP .0059
lnNOIC 4.87 DREIT 1.46
UUPS 4.54 T09 1.29
RM 4.49 DRENO 1.21
UMID 4.37 DPORT 1.21
NEMP 2.14 DLAND 1.17
T07 2.07 DH20 1.10  
Mean VIF 3.47
Table 3: Correlations and Elasticity Estimates 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix – Selected Variables in All Hotels Regressions
Panel B: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) Panel C: Hotel Asset Price Elasticity (ηP)**
Notes:  This table reports correlations and elasticity estimates among variables in the hotel property regression models from Table 2. ** Elasticity only 
reported for continuous variables because of interpretational difficulty. 
Sources: CoStar, Moody's Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital Analytics, and Smith Travel Research.
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Right Side 
Variable Label Name Coefficient z
ln(NOIC) City NOI .2239* 7.74
ln(C) Capitalization Rate -.5195* -7.66
RM Number of Rooms .0006* 2.28
EA Effective Age at Date of Sale -.0079* -2.46
EA2 Effective Age Squared .0001 1.42
NEMP 3M Number of Employees .0001* 6.59
DCBD CBD Location .3222* 4.74
DLAND Landmark Hotel .3641* 3.36
DH2O Water Location .4014* 6.27
DRENO Recently Renovated .0801 1.20
UUPS Upper Upscale Chain Scale -.3321* -2.93
UPS Upscale Chain Scale -.6281* -5.45
UMID Upper Midscale Chain Scale -.9133* -7.12
MID Midscale Chain Scale -.9454* -7.42
ECO Economy Chain Scale -1.3349* -10.26
DREIT REIT Buyer .3403* 5.98
DPORT Portfolio Sale .1205* 2.27
T06 1 = Sold in 2006 .1298* 1.79
T07 1 = Sold in 2007 .1428* 2.20
T08 1 = Sold in 2008 .1273* 1.79
T09 1 = Sold in 2009 -.0678 -0.69
T10 1 = Sold in 2010 -.1361 -1.65
α Constant 16.27* 115.24
N  623
R2 .7991
RMSE .5112
Table 4: Two-Stage LS Results, All Hotels 
Notes: This table presents the results from regressing property 
characteristics, date-of-sale, and present value variables on hotel 
transaction prices with alternative functional forms. * Significant at .10 or 
better.                                                                                                                
Sources: CoStar, Moody's Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital 
Analytics, and Smith Travel Research.
Dependent Variable ln(P)
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Stage 
Right Side 
Variable 
Label Name Coefficient t Coefficient z
ln(NOIC) City NOI .2452* 3.47 .3242* 5.30
ln(C) Capitalization Rate -.7205* -3.90 -.7350* -4.29
RM Number of Rooms .00016 0.34 .0001 0.26
EA Effective Age at Date of Sale -.0135 -1.66 -.0128 -1.69
EA2 Effective Age Squared .0001 1.16 .0001 1.09
NEMP 3M Number of Employees .0004* 2.70 .0004* 2.92
DCBD CBD Location .3267* 2.35 .3349* 2.60
DGATE Gateway City .1503 1.14 N/A N/A
DLAND Landmark Hotel .2433 1.28 .2802 1.62
DH2O Water Location .3426* 2.52 .3809* 2.56
DRENO Recently Renovated .0411 0.37 .0379 0.36
DREIT REIT Buyer .3241* 2.22 .3122* 2.32
DPORT Portfolio Sale .0045 0.03 -.0151 -0.11
T06 1 = Sold in 2006 .2038 1.14 .1940 1.16
T07 1 = Sold in 2007 .2904 1.62 .3087* 1.88
T08 1 = Sold in 2008 .2581 1.21 .2766 1.41
T09 1 = Sold in 2009 -.1939 -0.74 -.1742 -0.72
T10 1 = Sold in 2010 -.1431 -0.69 -.1097 -0.58
α Constant 15.82* 72.33 15.73* 77.14
N = 140
R2 Adjusted .6020 .6479
RMSE Root Mean Square Error .6023 .5644
Note: This table presents the results from regressing property characteristics, date-of-sale, and 
present value variables on luxury and upper upscale hotel transaction prices using both single- and 
two-stage models. * Significant at .10 or better.                                                                                            
Sources: CoStar, Moody's Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital Analytics, and Smith 
Travel Research.
Table 5: One- and Two-Stage LS Results, Luxury and Upper Upscale Hotels
Dependent Variable ln(P) ln(P)
Single Two
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Stage 
Right Side 
Variable 
Label Name Coefficient t Coefficient z
ln(NOIC) City NOI .2127* 4.50 3081* 7.82
ln(C) Capitalization Rate -.5563* -3.60 -.5799* -3.88
RM Number of Rooms .0001 0.00 -.0002 -0.27
EA Effective Age at Date of Sale -.0120* -2.29 -.0118* -2.32
EA2 Effective Age Squared .0001* 2.04 .0001* 2.10
NEMP 3M Number of Employees .0003* 2.69 .0003* 2.70
DCBD CBD Location .4802* 4.31 .5001* 4.65
DGATE Gateway City .2029* 2.38 N/A N/A
DLAND Landmark Hotel .3669* 1.86 .3649* 1.90
DH2O Water Location .6263* 6.18 .6389* 6.51
DRENO Recently Renovated .2232* 1.77 .2195* 1.80
DREIT REIT Buyer .3930* 4.64 .3812* 4.67
DPORT Portfolio Sale .1539* 1.93 .1403* 1.82
T06 1 = Sold in 2006 .1874 1.65 .1569 1.42
T07 1 = Sold in 2007 .1539 1.51 .1310 1.32
T08 1 = Sold in 2008 .0878 0.80 .0656 0.61
T09 1 = Sold in 2009 .1526 0.86 .1450 0.84
T10 1 = Sold in 2010 -.0454 -0.35 -.0917 -0.73
α Constant 15.48 116.78 15.49* 121.23
N = 254
R2 Adjusted .5911 .6094
RMSE Root Mean Square Error .5215 .5087
Note: This table presents the results from regressing property characteristics, date-of-sale, and 
present value variables on upscale and upper midscale hotel transaction prices using both single-  
and two-stage models. * Significant at .10 or better.                                                                                            
Sources: CoStar, Moody's Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital Analytics, and Smith 
Travel Research.
Table 6: One- and Two-Stage LS Results, Upscale and Upper Midscale Hotels
ln(P) ln(P)
Single Two
Dependent Variable
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Stage 
Right Side 
Variable 
Label Name Coefficient t Coefficient z
ln(NOIC) City NOI .0424 0.66 .1750* 3.23
ln(C) Capitalization Rate -.5013* -3.13 -.5185* -3.36
RM Number of Rooms -.0002 -0.14 -.0005 -0.38
EA Effective Age at Date of Sale -.0112* -2.29 -.0105* -2.25
EA2 Effective Age Squared .00002 0.29 .00002 0.34
NEMP 3M Number of Employees .0005* 4.40 .0005* 4.35
DCBD CBD Location .1665 1.23 .1987 1.53
DGATE Gateway City .1952* 2.33 N/A N/A
DLAND Landmark Hotel -.0811 -0.23 -.0521 -0.16
DH2O Water Location .1361 1.03 .1329 1.04
DRENO Recently Renovated -.0807 -0.51 -.0940 -0.61
DREIT REIT Buyer .5230* 4.90 .5066* 4.92
DPORT Portfolio Sale .2067* 2.34 .2185* 2.56
T06 1 = Sold in 2006 .1173 0.91 .0462 0.37
T07 1 = Sold in 2007 .0012 0.01 -.0461 -0.46
T08 1 = Sold in 2008 .1278 1.13 .0611 0.56
T09 1 = Sold in 2009 -.1335 -0.92 -.1748 -1.24
T10 1 = Sold in 2010 -.1659 -1.09 -.2042 -1.39
α Constant 15.45* 97.91 15.49* 102.28
N = 229
R2 Adjusted .5607 .5824
RMSE Root Mean Square Error .4734 .4606
Note: This table presents the results from regressing property characteristics, date-of-sale, and 
present value variables on midscale and economy hotel transaction prices using both single- and two-
stage models. * Significant at .10 or better.                                                                                                              
Sources: CoStar, Moody's Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital Analytics, and Smith 
Travel Research.
Table 7: One- and Two-Stage LS Results, Midscale and Economy Hotels
ln(P) ln(P)
Single Two
Dependent Variable
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